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Abstract
It is unknown how the current Asian origin highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses arrived, but these viruses
are now poised to become endemic in North America. Wild birds harbor these viruses and have dispersed them at
regional scales. What is unclear is how the viruses may be moving from the wild bird reservoir into poultry
holdings. Active surveillance of live wild birds is likely the best way to determine the true distribution of these
viruses. We also suggest that sampling be focused on regions with the greatest risk for poultry losses and attempt
to define the mechanisms of transfer to enhance biosecurity. Responding to the recent outbreaks of highly
pathogenic avian influenza in North America requires an efficient plan with clear objectives and potential
management outcomes.
Background
The original United States interagency strategic plan for
detection of Asian highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influ-
enza was developed nearly a decade ago, with focus on the
early detection of an exotic virus [1]. The current out-
breaks of HPAI H5N8 and H5N2, caused by foreign origin
viruses, have very quickly become widely distributed
within North America, thus negating the need for early
detection at the broad scale. Two new avian influenza sur-
veillance and monitoring documents have been recently
released that address early detection at local and regional
scales. One focuses on detection of HPAI in waterfowl in
high priority watersheds and the spread of viruses to new
areas of concern [2]. The other encompasses a strategy for
early detection of avian influenza viruses of significance in
wild birds in general, and encourages sampling of areas
with high poultry density [3]. We propose taking these
plans a step further by suggesting a 2-tiered surveillance
strategy focusing on waterfowl and bridge species in the
vicinity of poultry operations. This 2-step sampling design
would address the mechanism(s) of virus transfer and pro-
vide data that can inform management actions that
minimize the impact of these viruses on domestic poultry.
Main text
It is unknown how HPAI H5 viruses from Asia reached
North America [4–7]. Asian origin HPAI H5 viruses were
first detected in North America in November of 2014 in
poultry farms along the Fraser River in southwestern
Canada but it is unknown how these viruses were intro-
duced [8]. Extensive sampling for the Asian HPAI H5N1
from 2006-2010 failed to reveal evidence of intact foreign
avian influenza (AI) viruses in North American wild birds
[9]. However, numerous AI viruses isolated from wild
birds in North America were shown to contain individual
genes that originated in Asia leading to the conclusion
that wild birds do transfer viruses among continents, al-
though these viruses appear to be reassorted into the local
AI community [10–12]. Thus, the detection in November
of 2014 of a non-reassorted AI virus in North America
[13] is unusual, although not unprecedented [14]. Further
sampling in early 2015 confirmed that the Asian origin
HPAI H5N8 subsequently reassorted with endemic
viruses into at least two different HPAI subtypes, H5N2
and H5N1 [7, 8]. Thus, within a small geographic area and
a short period of time, HPAI H5 viruses of foreign origin
were identified in both poultry and wild birds in western
North America. A key question involves the transmission
pathway. Does this represent long distance-intercontinental
dispersal of HPAI H5N8 by wild birds with subsequent
transmission to poultry [6]? Alternatively, were the viruses
introduced directly into poultry from an unknown source
with subsequent dispersal into wild birds? Given the
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available data, both mechanisms are plausible and we can-
not distinguish between these competing hypotheses.
Regardless of introductory mechanism, the HPAI H5 is
now poised to become endemic in wild birds of North
America [4], with the question of transmission pathway
now more relevant at regional and local scales. Sampling
within the Pacific Flyway of North America suggests that
wild birds have dispersed HPAI viruses within this region
[15]. Similarly, opportunistic sampling within the Missis-
sippi Flyway demonstrates that HPAI viruses were more
broadly distributed in space and time than detected in
poultry outbreaks [15]. Equating the timing of detection
in wild birds with the timing of arrival in a given area
requires the assumption that sampling intensity was suffi-
cient to detect the virus with high sensitivity (i.e., probabil-
ity of virus detection when present in the population
under surveillance). Given that active surveillance has
been opportunistic, the sensitivity of the sampling is
unknown, but may have been low, resulting in uncertainty
regarding timing of dispersal. Equating patterns of poultry
outbreaks of a virus that originated in wild birds with
actual patterns of virus distribution and spread requires
even more assumptions.
Movement of AI from wild birds to poultry
We developed a conceptual model that characterizes the
process of AI transmission from wild birds into poultry
holdings (Fig. 1). The widespread distribution of HPAI in
wild birds in the Pacific Flyway (seven states) combined
with the small number of reported commercial poultry
outbreaks (two in CA) in the same area implies that
completion of the pathway described in the model (i.e.,
the product of all three probabilities) may be relatively
rare. Given that this is a rare event, the time lag between
transmission of a virus to a specific area by wild birds and
transfer leading to infection of poultry is unknown. The
full distribution of HPAI H5 viruses in wild birds in the
Mississippi Flyway remains unknown, but the timeline
where poultry outbreaks occurred from north to south at
a time when general waterfowl migration was moving in
the opposite direction may simply represent variable time
lags between introduction of the virus and its appearance
in poultry holdings. We hypothesize that environmental
factors likely influence the process of AI transmission
from wild birds into poultry. For example, severe weather
may encourage bridge species to try and enter poultry
barns for food and/or shelter. Alternatively, warm weather
may increase access for bridge species as barns are opened
for ventilation. If the probabilities in our model are influ-
enced by environmental conditions, there is no basis for
assuming a consistent time lag. Further there is likely
spatial and temporal variation in the probabilities within
our model. For example, the ratio of commercial poultry
farms in the Mississippi to the Pacific Flyway is about 4:1
and the comparable ratio of HPAI H5 outbreaks is >50:1
[15]. Thus, it appears that the probability of completing
the modeled process varied among regions or time pe-
riods. Little is known regarding the mechanisms of trans-
fer between wild waterfowl and commercial poultry and
external factors which may alter those mechanisms.
Because HPAI H5 viruses were found in waterfowl
species in numerous locations in both the Pacific and
Fig. 1 Conceptual model of the process of introduction and wild bird dispersal of HPAI and subsequent infection of commercial poultry
holdings. The rectangular boxes (1-3) represent probabilities and the circles represent external factors that influence the probabilities. It is unlikely
that direct transfer between waterfowl and poultry occurs. It has been proposed that “bridge species” that interact or share habitats with wild
waterfowl and occur on poultry farms facilitate the transfer [14, 15]. Potential bridge species may be birds, rodents, and/or invertebrates
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Mississippi Flyways, we assumed that the first probability
in Fig. 1 of our conceptual model was very high (i.e., 1.0 at
numerous locations). Relatively little is known about po-
tential bridge species but they likely vary by region and in
some cases by season. Burns et al. [16] identified 121 spe-
cies of wild birds that occurred in the vicinity of commer-
cial poultry operations in Canada and Caron et al. [17]
described > 200 species from a series of sites in Zimbabwe.
However, both studies identified a much smaller sub-set
of species that were common and considered capable of
transmitting AI. Specifically, Burns et al. [16] noted
European Starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) and Rock Pigeons
(Columba livia) as two wild bird species most likely to
enter commercial poultry facilities. Boon et al. [18] inocu-
lated starlings and pigeons with HPAI H5N1 and docu-
mented active infections with no mortality. Thus, we
suggest that these two common and wide spread birds are
examples of potential bridge species for HPAI in North
America. Other studies have documented HPAI in insects
[19–21] and LPAI in rodents [22] making the potential
range of bridge species quite large.
Effective wild bird surveillance
Detection of HPAI H5N8 and H5N2 in wild waterfowl
in Asia, Europe, and North America has resulted from
active surveillance and isolated dead bird investigations
[13, 23, 24]. Knight-Jones et al. [25] conducted detailed
analyses comparing various surveillance sampling
techniques used to detect Asian HPAI H5N1 at Lake
Constance in Europe. They concluded that sentinel bird
sampling and testing of birds found dead were the most
sensitive and cost effective techniques. However, they
noted that the utility of dead bird testing is highly
dependent on the probability of a dead bird being found
and mortality rates. In their review, Hoye et al. [26] con-
cluded that dead bird surveillance cannot be used to infer
complete presence or absence distributions of HPAI if the
viruses do not cause mortality. Kang et al. [27] exposed
wild caught Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) and Baikal Teal
(Anas formosa) to HPAI H5N8 in a controlled trial and
noted that all birds became infected and shed virus at high
rates. No mortality occurred in 41 inoculated Mallards but
1 of 2 teal died without showing clinical signs and the
cause of death was not determined. In a reported mortality
event in South Korea, HPAI H5N8 was isolated from tis-
sues of eight waterbird species and Baikal Teal, in particu-
lar, exhibited a combination of clinical signs and gross and
microscopic lesions leading the authors to conclude that
HPAI was a cause of mortality [28]. Thus, Baikal Teal may
be susceptible to H5N8, but Jeong et al. [24] found H5
antibodies in >50 % of live/wild Baikal Teal sampled, im-
plying that the realized mortality rate in the wild must be
fairly low. Zhao et al. [29] exposed 6-week-old Mallards to
HPAI H5N8 and similarly observed no mortality within
14 days. Given the apparent low mortality rate for wild
birds exposed to HPAI H5N8 some authors have con-
cluded that active surveillance is the preferred approach
[23, 27, 30, 31]. Further, the apparent spread of HPAI
H5N8 in wild birds in North America (from Washington
south within the Pacific Flyway) has been primarily de-
tected with active surveillance and is notable for a dearth
of reported mortality events. Thus, active directed surveil-
lance sampling of live birds appears to have the highest
sensitivity for determining the true distribution of the
HPAI H5 viruses currently circulating in wild birds in
North America. Testing of dead birds associated with mor-
tality investigations may provide an ancillary source of in-
formation on avian influenza viruses, revealing new
geographic locations of H5 viruses or changes in viral
pathogenicity or host range [2, 26]. However, such sampling
is, by its very nature, opportunistic and unpredictable, limit-
ing inference regarding the distribution of these viruses.
As more is learned about the epizootiology of HPAI H5
viruses, surveillance techniques in North America and
elsewhere can be tailored to optimize detection. Further-
more, the HPAI situation in North America presents an
opportunity to investigate the potential movement of
these viruses among wild birds and poultry facilities. At
this time, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
considers the risk posed to human health by the HPAI H5
viruses found in wild birds and poultry in North America
to be low [32]. Yet, these viruses pose substantial risk to
the commercial poultry industry where losses have signifi-
cant economic impacts. Therefore, a tiered sampling
approach in response to HPAI H5 viruses currently circu-
lating in North America may be the most efficient surveil-
lance strategy. Such an approach would allow sampling to
be segregated seasonally and geographically, and targeted
based on risk. Machalaba et al. [31] noted that high lati-
tude sampling associated with breeding areas seem to in-
dicate relative “hotspots” for AI. These high latitude areas
also occur in regions where birds from multiple flyways
overlap creating the potential for broad scale dispersal of
viruses along an East-West gradient (Fig. 2) [7]. Thus,
breeding season sampling would focus on higher latitude
areas and assess the risk for spread across flyways. Wild
bird surveillance sampling outside of the breeding season
could incorporate a risk-based approach by focusing in
areas with the highest density of poultry (Fig. 2), with
stratification at multiple levels (flyway, state, and county).
Retrospective studies have demonstrated that the likeli-
hood of AI outbreaks in poultry increased with proximity
to wetlands [32–34]. Thus, habitat mapping could be used
to target sampling at farms with the greatest risk.
Conclusions
Surveillance activities should go beyond simply docu-
menting and tracking where HPAI H5 viruses occur, but
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rather target sampling in areas where management out-
comes can be applied that enhance biosecurity. The
existing HPAI surveillance plan for waterfowl focuses on
early detection of viruses in specific areas (Fig. 1, box 1),
selected on the basis of watershed characteristics, dab-
bling duck populations and movements, and previous AI
activity [2]. For example, that plan calls for a greater
sampling effort in areas of Utah and Nevada with priori-
tized watersheds and mixing of dabbling ducks but little
commercial poultry production, than in the portions of
Iowa and Minnesota where commercial poultry losses
associated with H5N2 exceeded 40 million birds in
spring 2015 [2, 15]. We propose that sampling be strati-
fied in relation to the risk of economic damage to the
poultry industry associated with these viruses by target-
ing areas of highest poultry density (Fig. 2) [3]. When
HPAI is detected in a region, either in wild birds or
poultry, directed sampling should immediately expand
to include potential bridge species appropriate to spe-
cific locations and time (Fig. 1, box 2). Poultry facilities
attract flies, rodents, and other pests and an investiga-
tion of 81 HPAI-positive turkey farms in the Midwestern
U.S. in 2015 indicated that wild birds were observed
within facilities on 35 % of farms [35, 36]. Wildlife sur-
veys and poultry facility investigations can be used to
identify high priority bridge species [16, 17,36]. Identifi-
cation of the pathways by which HPAI can move from
waterfowl into commercial poultry holdings can then be
used to enhance and actively target biosecurity [31]
(Fig. 1, box 3). We emphasize that in our conceptual
model of HPAI movement, biosecurity is the only factor
that could be controlled (Fig. 1). As such, a logical goal
of a surveillance program would be to facilitate enhance-
ment of biosecurity. Understanding which bridge species
may be involved, when, how, and why they enter poultry
facilities is necessary to define potential counter
Fig. 2 Poultry sales in 2012 by state in relation to major waterfowl flyways in North America. Poultry sales (layers, pullets, broilers, turkeys) as an
index of density can be used to stratify wild bird surveillance sampling during the non-breeding season. This approach would target sampling in
locations where the greatest risk of economic damage could occur. Sampling at high latitudes during the breeding season when populations
from the various flyways (including Asian flyways) overlap can identify the potential for spread among the flyways. Poultry data from the 2012
Census of Agriculture [13]
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strategies. Clearly the response to avian vs mammalian
bridge species would be different. It may also be pro-
ductive to pursue identification of bridge species associ-
ated with low pathogenic AI infections, as these are
common in wild waterfowl and occur annually in com-
mercial poultry [37]. Detailed studies of epidemiological
links between wild waterfowl and commercial poultry
may provide a means to target biosecurity and lessen the
economic impacts of the HPAI viruses currently circu-
lating in in North America. Timely analyses of collected
samples and rapid response to positive detections from
surveillance results are also essential to facilitating man-
agement outcomes.
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